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All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial
Review Under the California
Constitution
By GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN*
AND CLIFFORD K. THOMPSON, JR.**

Introduction
Over the past several years, the California Constitution has supplanted the Federal Constitution as the basis for the California
Supreme Court's judicial review of the actions of coordinate branches
of state government. This trend reflects our state supreme court's desire
to avoid Burger Court limitations on Warren Court decisions by insulating itself from United States Supreme Court review. Those pleased
with its results hail this trend as a triumph of personal liberty, marking
a shift in the balance of power between government and the governed.
This characterization is oversimplified and misleading. Under the
supremacy clause,1 no state constitution can protect the individual
against the actions of the federal government, the principal repository
of power in this nation. Moreover, as state courts increasingly prove
willing to protect their citizens under state constitutions, the Federal
Supreme Court may feel less obliged to extend the protection of the
federal charter.
Equally important, justifying state constitutional interpretation in
terms of individual rights diverts attention from the fact that it represents a significant reallocation of power from state legislatures to state
courts. State courts invoking their own constitutions not only escape
federal judicial review, they are free to reformulate traditional standards for testing the constitutionality of legislation. Many state courts
have done so, substituting for the familiar "reasonable relationship"
* Attorney General of the State of California, J.D., 1952 St. John's University; B.A.,
1949, Siena College.
** Deputy Attorney General of the State of California; LL.B., 1966, University of California; A.B., 1960, Princeton University.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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due process standard, "substantial relation,"2 "real and substantial relation"3 and "close and substantial relationship" 4 tests. Each of these
standards reduces judicial deference to legislative judgments. California is the birthplace of a "new judicial independence," 5 but it remains
to be seen whether our state supreme court is declaring independence
from Washington, D.C. or Sacramento.
The California Supreme Court has not only rediscovered the state
constitution, it has found in it inherent judicial powers.6 These new
powers are being asserted during a period which former United States
Attorney General Edward Levi calls "the courtification of America."'
Courts are being asked to involve themselves in wide variety of affairs
which test their competence and legitimacy.' A federal court, for example, was required to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed to a guard in a women's basketball game the right to make
a full-court dribble;9 a California appellate court was called upon to
decide whether a restaurant's exclusion of men, but not women, wearing leisure suits violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act.' 0
Part I of this article discusses the history, nature and scope of the
power of state courts to interpret state constitutions. The power of a
state court to interpret its state constitution is not challenged here, but
the manner in which the California Supreme Court exercises that
power is questioned. Accordingly, Part II analyzes judicial review
under the California Constitution, with a view toward distinguishing
between proper judicial interpretation of the state constitution and judicial incursion into legislative or executive power.
If our state courts endeavor to intensify and expand the scope of
judicial review, they are obliged to develop institutional guidelines for
checking their own powers. It is contended in Part III that unwar2. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 193, 272 A.2d 487, 492
(1971).
3. Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 348 Mass. 414, 422, 204 N.E.2d 281,
287 (1965).
4. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 497-98 (Alas. 1975).
5. Note, State ConstitutionalGuaranteesAsAdequateState Ground- Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM.CRIM. L. REv. 737, 740 (1976).
6. People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 95, 473 P.2d 993, 997, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253 (1970).
7. E. Levi, Phleger Lecture, Stanford University, April 27, 1978 (unpublished).
8. See Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1, 15 (1978).
9. Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn.
1976), rev'd, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that physical differences between the
sexes justified different rules).
10. Hales v. Ojai Valley Inn & Country Club, 73 Cal. App. 3d 25, 140 Cal. Rptr. 555
(1977) (construing section 51 of the California Civil Code (West Supp. 1979).
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ranted reliance on the California Constitution or on dual federal and
state constitutional provisions threatens to disrupt the balance of our
system of government. Thus, the need for developing principles of selfrestraint and predictable bases for invoking the state constitution is evident. This analysis is less than definitive, but more than impressionistic; if it is critical it is because, as Justice Frankfurter has reminded us,
'"judges must be kept mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate
public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with
candor however blunt."'
I.

The Power of a State Court to Interpret Its State
Constitution

National, state and historical perspectives all confirm the power of
a state court to construe its own state constitution. State charters anticipated the Federal Bill of Rights by as much as a decade. 2 After the
first ten amendments were added to the Federal Constitution they were
held not to limit state governments. In 1833, the Supreme Court declared: "The constitution was ordained and established by the People
of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not
for the government of the individual states."' 3 Before the adoption of
constitutions protected individthe Fourteenth Amendment, only state
4
governments.'
state
their
from
uals
As the provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights were selectively incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, state constitutions diminished in importance. It is by no means clear that Supreme Court
imposition of federal standards upon the states was inevitable. Professor Vern Countryman suggests that "the Supreme Court got into the
business of developing the federal Bill of Rights through the default of
11.

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
12. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550-51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr.

315, 329 (1975); Note, Robinson at Large in the Fifty States: 4 Continuationofthe State Bills
ofRights Debate in the Search andSeizure Context, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 1, 6-13 (1975);
Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REv. 325, 332 (1973).
13. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
See generally Mosk, ContemporaryFederalism, 9 PAC. L.J. 711 (1978).
14. This was consistent with the Founders' federal scheme. "In the compound republic
of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments; and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time each will be controlled by itself." THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) at 339 (Modem Library ed. 1937) (quoted
in ProjectReport: Toward an Activist Rolefor State Bills ofRights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 271, 285 (1973)); see Mosk, supra note 2, at 719.
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the state courts."' 5 On the other hand, judicial restrictions on federal
governmental powers were certain to follow Marburv v. Afadison.' 6
Since, under the supremacy clause,17 state courts cannot limit national
government, Supreme Court interpretation of the Bill of Rights was
unavoidable. Had state court inaction not impelled the high court to
extend such interpretations to the states, the Court nevertheless would
have developed a federal model for state courts to accept or reject.
Despite the extension of federal constitutional protections to the
states, state constitutions never completely lost their vitality. After
1937, when the Supreme Court stopped invalidating economic regulations on due process grounds, some state courts "continued to interfere
freely with legislative policies" under state constitutional due process
provisions.' 8 State courts became sufficiently active in this enterprise to
inspire one commentator to declare, "The courts of the states, in their
efforts to strike a balance between the economic freedom of the individual and the power of government, may well cause state constitutional
law 'to become of dominant importance'. . . ."1 While this expecta-

tion remains unfulfilled, some state courts are doing their part by striking down, for example, legislative regulations prohibiting pharmacists
from advertising their prices for dangerous drugs,2" forbidding the
manufacture of dairy products with non-dairy additives2 ' and condemning the scalping of football tickets.22 An additional factor in
maintaining the strength of state constitutions is that state courts were
obliged to apply state constitutional provisions whose federal analogues were not selectively incorporated until later years. California,
for example, gave content to its double jeopardy provision 3 before the
parallel Fifth Amendment guarantee was made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1969.24
The essential similarity of federal and state constitutions nonethe15. Countryman, Why A State Bill ofRights?, 45 WASH. L. REv. 454, 464 (1970).
16. 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
18. Paulsen, The PersistenceofSubstantive Due Processin the States, 34 MINN. L. Rv.
91, 92 (1950).
19. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due ProcessofLaw, 53
Nw. U.L. REv. 226, 250-51 (1958).
20. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971).
21. People ex rel. Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 176 Colo. 396, 490 P.2d 940
(1971).
22. Estell v. City of Birmingham, 291 Ala. 680, 286 So. 2d 872 (1973).
23. Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961)
(followed in Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 470 P.2d 345, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970)).
24. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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less leads to conflict between federal and state court interpretations.
Acknowledging this conflict, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that "a State is free as a matter of its own law to
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court
holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards."2' 5 The
high court acknowledges that state courts "may indeed differ as to the
appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake" in constitutional
controversies. 26 "But, of course, a State may not impose such greater
restrictions as a matter of federal constitutionallaw when this Court
specifically refrains from imposing them." 27 The Supreme Court has
thereby made explicit what is arguably implicit in supremacy clause
language which provides that federal law shall be supreme "and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."28
Californians apparently have embraced the concept of a state constitution of independent force. In 1878, the California constitutional
convention rejected a proposed amendment declaring: "We recognize
the Constitution of the United States of America as the great charter of
our liberties, and the paramount law of the land." 29 Moreover, in 1974,
the electorate adopted article I, section 24 of the present California
Constitution: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."3
Federalism does place certain restraints upon a state court's power
to implement its own constitution. A state court may not give such
broad effect to a state constitutional provision as to interfere with a
conflicting federal right. Accordingly, in Diamond v. Bland3 , a majority of the California Supreme Court held that the right of free speech
guaranteed to initiative petitioners by the California Constitution could
25. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). 4ccord, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58, 62 (1967). Nevertheless, recent reliance upon state constitutions by state tribunals seeking to avoid Burger Court limitations on Warren Court decisions falls short of a renaissance.
Only a minority of state courts have invoked state charters to evade Burger court rulings.
Mosk, supra note 13 at 718. See Wilkes, The New Federalismin CriminalProcedure: State
Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974).
26. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
120 (1975) (Brennan, J.,dissenting), Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366-80 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring).
27. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (emphasis in original).
28. U.S. CONST. art. V1, § 2.
29. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, CAL. CONST. CONVENTION 1878-1879, at 179 (1880),
quotedin People v. Hannon, 19 Cal. 3d 588, 606 n.8, 564 P.2d 1203, 1214 n.8, 138 Cal. Rptr.
885, 896 n.8 (1977).
30. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 24 (West Supp. 1979).
31. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974).
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not, under the supremacy clause, defeat a shopping center owner's federally protected property interest. The Diamond court felt that these
federal protections had been established in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.3 2
However, the California Supreme Court has evidenced an intent
to be circumscribed by more restrictive federal rights in only the narrowest of degrees. Only five years after deferring to the United States
Supreme Court in Diamond,the California court reconsidered its prior
holding. In Robins v. PruneyardShopping Center,33 the court held that
Lloyd "is primarily a First Amendment case." 34 Since after a narrow
reading, the Lloyd opinion was held not to prescribe federally protected property rights, there was no longer a supremacy clause bar to a
more expansive reading of the California Constitution:
A closer look at Lloyd Corp. has revealed that it does not
prevent California's providing greater protection than the First
Amendment now seems to provide. We conclude that sections 2
and 3 of article I of the California Constitution protect speech
and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even
when the centers are privately owned.35
Accordingly, the court overruled Diamond. The United States
Supreme Court will hear the Robins case, however.
Federal courts are not obliged to vindicate state constitutional provisions which confer greater protection than their federal counterparts.
Where a defendant complains of evidence admitted at a state trial on
grounds of illegal search or seizure, the Supreme Court instructs, "the
test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state court may
have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably supressed. '36 As one commentator has expressed:
The Court does not impose upon the lower federal courts a duty
to enforce all state rules governing state officers. If state law condemns a given act, while under the Supreme Court interpretation
the fourteenth amendment has not been violated, a duty to help
32. Id at 335 n.4, 521 P.2d at 463 nA, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471 n.4 (relying on Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)).
33. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
34. Id at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
35. Id at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (citation omitted). The United
States Supreme Court, on November 13, 1979, posponed a determination of jurisdiction in
PruneyardShoppingCenter v. Robins until hearing the case on the merits. 48 U.S.L.W. 3322
(1979).
36. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960) (quotedin United States v. Cella,
568 F.2d 1266, 1279 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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enforce that state policy never arises. 7
Federal officers acting pursuant to federal law are not governed by
state law. A United States Attorney, for example, could directly obtain,
and later use in a federal prosecution, bank records which, as a matter
of state constitutional law, the California Supreme Court has held
available only through legal process.3 8 This procedure is possible only
because the United States Supreme Court has held that such records
are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.3 9
As has been demonstrated, within our federal framework, state
courts have the power to interpret their own constitutions. The way in
which that power has been and will be exercised, however, gives rise to
serious questions. The following section will discuss the need for courts
to exercise self-restraint in expanding state constitutional interpretation
and to develop principled neutral bases for invoking the state, rather
than the federal, constitution.
II.
A.

Principles of Judicial Review Under State Constitutions

Self-Restraint

"[T]he only check upon our own exercise of power is our own
sense of self-restraint," Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone said of the
United States Supreme Court. 40 This assessment is placed in perspective by the famous dictum of his predecessor, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes: "The Constitution is what the judges say it is."' 4 1 For
various reasons, not the least of which were a healthy respect for the
coordinate branches of government and a sense of its own limitations,
the Supreme Court developed doctrines of self-restraint which stay the
exercise of its power in cases concededly within its jurisdiction. Many
of these rules were elaborated by Justice Brandeis, concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authoriy.42 He explained that the Court
would not decide constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary,
would decide cases on non-constitutional grounds when possible,
37. Berman & Oberst, Admissibility ofEvidence Obtainedby an UnconstitutionalSearch
and Seizure-FederalProblems, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 525, 546 (1960).
38. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
California courts, however, would bar evidence seized by federal agents in violation of
state-but not federal-law. People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1973).
39. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
40. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). Justice Stone
became Chief Justice on October 6, 1941.
41. C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 120 (1928).
42. 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1935) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Accord, Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 97 (1968); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961).
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would not pass on the validity of a statute attacked by one who failed
to show injury, and would not formulate a constitutional rule broader
than necessary to decide the case at hand.43 Professor Herbert Wechsler insists that judicial self-restraint simply means that courts should
not impose their value choices on other branches of government, based
upon the Constitution, unless "they are persuaded, on an adequate and
principled analysis, that the choice is clear."'
It has been contended that state courts in general, and the California Supreme Court in particular, have failed to impose upon themselves constraints on the exercise of their powers.45 The difference
between the limited grant of judicial power contained in the Federal
Constitution and the somewhat vague and, therefore, broader grant of
power to judges found in the California Constitution offers a useful
starting point for considering the extent to which federal doctrines of
self-restraint should apply to California courts. Article III, section 2 of
the United States Constitution, which limits federal judicial power to
"cases" or "controversies," 46 has been understood to forbid advisory
opinions, that is, opinions which do not affect judgments.47 The grant
of judicial power in article VI of the California Constitution contains
no similar express limitation.48 Accordingly, the California Supreme
Court has decided moot cases which it felt presented live issues.4 9

When, if ever, it should do so is another matter.
It might be argued that the "cases" or "controversies" limitation
itself reflects a notion of self-restraint absent from the text of the state
constitution. However, the spirit of the federal limitation is manifested
in the California Code of Civil Procedure section 106 1,0 which makes
justiciability an integral part of California's Declaratory Judgment Act:
"The Court may refuse to exercise the power granted by this chapter in
43. Id
44. Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrincilesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 25
(1959). "A principled decision ... is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues
in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
result that is involved. When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value choices of other branches of the Government or of a state, those choices must, of
course, survive." Id at 19.
45. Linde, Judges, Critics,and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248-49 (1972).
46. For the judicial definition of "cases" or "controversies", see Golden v. Zwickler, 394
U.S. 103, 108 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941).
47. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,
125-26 (1945).
48. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
49. E.g., In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
50. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1061 (West 1955).
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any case where its declaration or determination is not necessary or
proper at the time under all the circumstances."'" Moreover, the California high court's assertion of vast powers of state constitutional interpretation, 52 augmented by recently developed "inherent judicial

powers,"53 obligates it to make justiciability a meaningful concept in its
decisional process.
Because it forms the apex of the federal judicial system, the United
States Supreme Court does follow certain principles of self-restraint
which are inapplicable to state courts. The related doctrines of absten-

tion54 and non-intervention 5 require federal deference to state courts
as the initial-but not ultimate-guardians of federal rights. There are
no analogous state court rules. Other rules of self-restraint are relevant
to state courts, however, because the underlying purposes transcend the

differences between the two court systems.
The California Supreme Court has acknowledged some principles

of restraint but has not taken them seriously. In People v. Williams the
court said, "[W]e do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us."'5 6 The court
disregards this rule, however, when it decides cases on both federal and
state constitutional grounds. 7 In Syrek v. CaliforniaUnemployment In-

suranceAppeals Board,8 the court recognized that:
The power of a court to declare a statute unconstitutional is an
ultimate power; its use should be avoided if a reasonable statutory construction makes the use unnecessary. Although in this
51. Notwithstanding the presence of an actual controversy, under this statute litigants
have no absolute right to a declaration of their rights. Citizens' Comm. for Old Age Pensions v. Bd. of Supervisors, 91 Cal. App. 2d 658, 660-61, 205 P.2d 761, 763 (1949). Issuance
of a declaratory judgment is left to the discretion of the trial court. People v. Ray, 181 Cal.
App. 2d 64, 67, 5 Cal. Rptr. 113, 114-15 (1960).
52. See, e.g., People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975).
53. Eg., In re Yurko, 10 Cal. 3d 857, 864, 519 P.2d 561, 565, 112 Cal. Rptr. 513, 517
(1974) (judicially declared rule of criminal procedure); People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 46 1,
503 P.2d 1313, 1321, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305, 313 (1972) (judicially declared rule of criminal
procedure); People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 95, 473 P.2d 993, 997, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253
(1970) (statute invalidated as impinging upon judicial power).
54. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Note, Developments in
the Lawn-Section 1983 andFederalisrm, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1250 (1977).
55. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Developments in the Lau-Section 1983
andFederalism,supra note 54, at 1274.
56. 16 Cal. 3d 663, 667, 547 P.2d 1000, 1003, 128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (1976).
57. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 944, 569 P.2d 1286, 1300, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 312
(1977) (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark criticized the majority's reliance on both state
and federal grounds, as well as the holding that a minor must be afforded procedural due
process prior to commitment to a mental institution.
58. 54 Cal. 2d 519, 354 P.2d 625, 7 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1960).
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case it is the constitutionality of the application of the statutes,
rather than the constitutionality of any statute itself, which is
challenged, the reason for judicial abstention from deciding constitutional questions is at least as strong in this particular case.59
But recently, in Hale v. Morgan,6° the court unanimously held an application of Civil Code section 789.361 unconstitutional on both federal
and state due process grounds even though constitutional adjudication
was not absolutely necessary. The statute imposed a penalty of $100
for each day a landlord deprived a tenant of utility services in an attempt to evict him. The plaintiff won a $17,300 judgment against a
landlord who disconnected water and electrical lines for 173 days. The
court narrowly construed the statute, thereby necessitating retrial on
the amount of damages properly recoverable. 62 However, the court
reached the statutory interpretation question only after condemning the
existing judgment as unduly disproportionate to the injury inflicted and
therefore violative of federal and state due process rights.6 3 Why did
the court denounce as constitutionally excessive a judgment admittedly
erroneous as a matter of statutory law? The apparent reason is that the
court wished to issue an advisory opinion to the Legislature: "a statute
which applies such a mandatory, fixed, substantial and cumulative punitive sanction against persons of such disparate culpability is manifestly suspect."'64 Not simply this statute, the court indicated, but any
similar statute is unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny. Judicial pronouncements of this kind clearly infringe on legislative prerogatives
and overstep the limits of judicial power.
The power to formulate rules of evidence or criminal procedure
which inheres in the judiciary is quite a different matter. This power is
shared with, but inferior to, that of the Legislature. Accordingly, judicially declared rules, unlike constitutional decisions, may be modified
by the Legislature. Adopting the exclusionary rule in People v.
Cahan,6 5 Justice Traynor emphasized that the court was announcing "a
judicially declared rule of evidence. ' 66 Justice Traynor was well aware
that the exclusionary rule could have been based on the state constitution and thus be beyond the reach of the Legislature, for rejecting it
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id at 526, 354 P.2d at 629, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 101 (citations omitted).
22 Cal. 3d 388, 584 P.2d 512, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1978).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.3 (West Supp. 1979).
22 Cal. 3d at 405-07, 584 P.2d at 523-24, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
Id at 397-405, 584 P.2d at 518-23, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 381-86.
Id at 400, 584 P.2d at 519, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
Id at 442, 282 P.2d at 910.
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thirteen years earlier in People v. Gonzales,67 he had observed that
"California is free to interpret its own Constitution." 68 One may infer
that Justice Traynor wished to leave the last word about protecting the
right of privacy to the Legislature.69
Other standards of justiciability, including standing and ripeness,
do not concern a court's competency ultimately to decide a particular
question but rather the propriety of deciding it in a particular case.70
The basic idea is that a fully informed decision is more likely to result
if the litigants have an actual and appreciable stake in the outcome.
Similarly, courts may decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction by
reason of the absence of an interested party. For example, the California Court of Appeals recently refused to entertain a taxpayer's suit
challenging the constitutionality of California's statutory bail scheme.7"
The court explained that the suit was an inappropriate vehicle for
resolving constitutional claim5 because the issue was not being contested by "the prosecuting authorities (the district attorney and the Attorney General) who are best prepared to meet the legal challenge
which has been launched," 72 nor was it prosecuted by any plaintiff who
was being denied bail. The California Supreme Court, however,
granted a hearing.
As the foregoing cases illustrate, state court self-restraint is more
essential than ever before because state courts now exercise greater
powers. Apart from insulating their decisions from federal scrutiny,
resort to state constitutions has allowed state courts to revise traditional
standards of judicial review. These new standards demand less deference to legislative and executive judgments.7 3 The need for self-restraint grows as one descends the judicial ladder since the power to
construe the state constitution cannot be confined by logic to the highest court. If intermediate appellate courts and trial courts invoke the
same power, however, near chaos could result. No federal precedent
would be entirely safe; long-accepted rules would be opened to doubt.
Fortunately, subordinate California courts understand this danger and
67. 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942).
68. Id at 169, 124 P.2d at 47.
69. See notes 119-24 and accompanying text infra.
70. See United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 158 (1961); California Water & Telephone Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 253 Cal. App. 2d 16, 22-23, 61 Cal. Rptr. 618, 622-24
(1967).
71. Van Atta v. Scott, 84 Cal. App. 3d 450, 148 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1978), hearinggranted,
November 9, 1978.
72. Id at 453, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
73. See also notes 176-83 and accompanying text infra.
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74
have proceeded carefully.
The fact that the California Constitution may be amended more
easily than the Federal Constitution may justify affording greater latitude to state judges. However, this difference must be discounted to the
extent that the California Supreme Court continues to inhibit the electoral process by basing its decisions on both state and federal constitutions.7 5 United States Supreme Court decisions obviously have greater
impact than those rendered by any state court. Still, the decisions of
the California Supreme Court affect some twenty million people whose
diversity reflects that of the nation. The impact of California decisions
is therefore sufficiently broad to counsel self-restraint.
Alexander Bickel warned that "judicial review is at least potentially a deviant institution in a democratic society. '7 6 In his incisive
commentary on state constitutional interpretation, Professor A.E. Dick
Howard adds, "The case for an independent role for state courts should
not be read as a case for unthinking activism. No judge, state or federal, is a knight errant, whose only concern is to do good. 7 7 Periodic
public confirmation does not distinguish state judges from lifetime federal jurists in this respect. Professor Howard continues: "Judicial review, even when exercised by elected judges, is never without an
anti-democratic flavor. ' 78 One may recognize the need for judicial independence as a safeguard of constitutional rights without approving
unnecessary constitutional adjudication or decisions which reject value
choices which the Legislature is more competent than the court to
make. It is judicial self-restraint that makes the tolerable the necessarily anti-democratic nature of judicial review. A further, and necessary,
check upon the exercise of judicial power, would be adherence to principled criteria to determine whether a decision should be based upon
federal or state constitutional grants. Such criteria will be delineated in
the following section.
74. E.g., People v. Bertoldo, 77 Cal. App. 3d 627, 632, 143 Cal. Rptr. 675, 678 (1978)
(refusing to interpret a newly adopted right of confrontation clause (CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 15) as barring admission of a witness' prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence). For a more expansive view of the role of inferior courts see Falk, The Supreme Court
of California 1971-1972-Foreword-The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate"
Nonfederal Ground,61 CAL. L. REa. 273, 281 n.34 (1973).
75. See Part IIIA infra.
76. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
RE. 40, 47 (1961). Contra, Bishin, JudicialReview in Democratic Theory, 50 So. CAL. L.
REv. 1099 (1977).
77. Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62
VA. L. REV. 873, 940-41 (1976).
78. Id at 941.
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Criteria for Invoking the State Constitution

Recent reliance upon the California Constitution by our state
supreme court has been viewed as xesult-oriented.7 9 The state charter
has been invoked to reach decisions contrary to existing or expected
United States Supreme Court rulings.8 0 At the same time, other decisions apparently have been based exclusively upon the Federal Constitution precisely because Supreme Court review was the desired result."'
Judicial strategy in inviting or foreclosing federal review has been con-

demned as a basis for selecting a state or federal ground for decision.82
Oregon Supreme Court Associate Justice (formerly Professor) Hans

Linde has specifically criticized the California Supreme Court's alternating use of state and federal constitutional guarantees as "if not ca-

pricious, at least ambivalent."83 Justice Linde is at least partially
correct: while the California court's choice of constitutions may be
considerably more purposeful than he suspects, the court has refused to
establish any neutral criteria for selection. 4 This failure, too, has been
79. Thompson, The Burger Court in the CaliforniaCrystal Ball, 5 Sw. U.L. REV. 238,
247 (1973); Note, The New Federaiwrm. Toward. PrincipledInterpretationofthe State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297, 316 (1977).
80. Eg., Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976)
(adopting view contrary to that expressed in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) and
other Supreme Court cases which found that compelled disclosure of defense information
did not violate a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.
3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976). Ramey relied on state and federal constitutional grounds to prohibit entry into a home to effect a warrantless arrest absent exigent
circumstances. The court's reliance on dual grounds may have been prompted by indications that the Supreme Court would narrow the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
81. See, e.g., Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 577 P.2d 188, 145 Cal. Rptr.
368 (1978); Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976). But Cf DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 37, 507 P.2d 1169, 1184-85
(1973), vacatedand remanded as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), where the Supreme Court of
Washington relied on both the state and federal equal protection guarantees to uphold a law
school minority admissions program.
82. Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REv. 325, 338-39 (1973).
83. Id at 336. See also Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J.
227, 250 (1972).
84. In People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr.
297, 302 n.4 (1975), the court specifically rejected what one commentator has called a "plea
for guidance as to the nature of the higher standard for searches and seizures in California."
Note, The New Federalism: Towarda PrincipledInterpretationof the State Constitution,29
STAN. L. REv. 297, 314 n.l 19 (1977). Concurring in Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d
71, 545 P.2d 229, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1976), former Chief Justice Wright briefly discussed
but did not significantly illuminate the subject, indicating only that certain cases presenting
issues which had been decided by the Supreme Court inconsistently with prior California
case law demanded immediate resolution on state grounds. Id at 84, 545 P.2d at 237, 127
Cal. Rptr. at 325 (Wright, CJ., concurring).
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criticized.8" The too frequent result is that litigants do not know which
constitution they were arguing about until after they receive the court's
decision.8 6
This state of affairs follows the California Supreme Court's abandonment of its earlier policy of deferring to United States Supreme
Court decisions. In 1938, in Gabrielliv. Knickerbocker, 7 the California
court declared:
State courts in interpreting provisions of the state Constitution
are not necessarily concluded by an interpretation placed on similar provisions in the federal Constitution. But. . .cogent reasons must exist before a state court in construing a provision of
the state Constitution will depart from the construction placed by
the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar provision in
the federal Constitution.88
The court's present view holds to the contrary: with regard to civil

liberties "our first referent is California law," and decisions of the federal high court "are to be followed by California courts only when they

provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California
law."'8 9 In short, United States Supreme Court decisions are "binding
only to the extent the Court's reasoning is intellectually persuasive."9 0
More accurately, California will follow the Supreme Court when a majority of the state court agrees with the choice among competing values
made by a majority of the federal court.91 That is not the kind of "co85. Note, The Supreme Court of California1975-1976-CriminalProcedure: Impeachment with ConstitutionalyInfirm Evidence, 65 CAL. L. REv.393, 402-03 (1977); Note, supra
note 79, at 313-14.
86. This problem was recognized in one recent opinion and undoubtedly occurs frequently. See, e.g., In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 947, 569 P.2d 1286, 1302, 141 Cal. Rptr.
298, 314 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting).
87. 12 Cal. 2d 85, 82 P.2d 391 (1938).
88. Id at 89, 82 P.2d at 392-93 (citations omitted).
89. People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr.
297, 302 n.4 (1975). Accord, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 285, 583 P.2d 748, 767, 148
Cal. Rptr. 890, 908 (1978).
90. Falk, supra note 74, at 282, approving this approach.
91. This approach has been adopted over strong dissents. In People v. Brisendine, 13
Cal. 3d 528, 555, 531 P.2d 1099, 1117, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 333 (1975) (Burke, J.,
dissenting),
Justice Burke argued: "Decisions of the United States Supreme Court as to the meaning of
language in a federal constitutional provision are strongly persuasive as to what interpretation should be placed upon similar language in a state Constitution." In People v. Norman,
14 Cal. 3d 929, 942, 538 P.2d 237, 246, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 118 (1975) (Clark, J., dissenting),
Justice Clark quotes the lower court opinion of Justice Thompson, urging that "'the state
system should accept the interpretation of the United States Supreme Court of language in
the federal Constitution as controlling of our interpretation of essentially identical language
in the California Constitution unless conditions peculiar to California support a different
meaning.",

Summer 1979]

ALL SAIL AND NO ANCHOR

gent reason" contemplated by Gabrielli.
It does not suffice that the California Supreme Court simply states,
"Ours is the power." Instead, as one commentator has said, "[t]he
court must convince the legal community and the citizenry at large that
it was justified in its disagreements with the Supreme Court and that
the state constitution supports different outcomes. ' 2
Some early decisions made absolutely no attempt to explain resort
to the state constitution rather than to the Federal Constitution. In Departmentof MentalHygiene v. Kirchner,93 People v. Krivda94 and Rios v.
Cozens,95 the United States Supreme Court, having granted certiorari,
found it necessary to remand to the California Supreme Court for a
determination of whether the latter's judgment was based on the California or United States Constitution. In each case the state supreme
court, without explanation, certified that its decision was based on state
law. The state court appeared to be constitution shopping. Beginning
with People v. Brisendine,96 the court undertook an explanation of its
reliance on the state constitution. It stressed the need for following
California precedent in the area of search and seizure, noted the
Supreme Court's acknowledgment that states are free to impose higher
standards of police practice than the Federal Constitution requires, and
emphasized the independent force of the California constitution. 97 The
difficulty with Brisendine and later case-oriented explanations is that
they establish no principled basis for repudiating federal precedent
and, accordingly, furnish no basis for predicting the future course of
decisional law.9" This defect may be remedied by justifying reference
to the state constitution in terms of neutral principles.
Before expounding those neutral principles it is necessary to deter92. Note, supra note 79, at 318 (footnote omitted).
93. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964), vacated,380 U.S. 194 (1965),
opn. on remand, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
94. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacatedsub nora. California v.
Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), opn. on remand, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521
(1973).
95. 7 Cal. 3d 792,499 P.2d 979, 103 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1972), vacatedsub nom. Department
of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1973), opn. on remand, 9 Cal. 3d 454, 509 P.2d 696,
107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973).
96. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (California Constitution
interpreted to require a higher standard of reasonableness to justify search of an arrestee's
effects-in this case an opaque bottle and envelopes containing contraband-than would
federal Constitution).
97. Id at 548-51, 531 P.2d at 1111-14, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 327-30.
98. "For litigants, the Brisendine approach to independent interpretation offers no great
improvement over Kirchner's cavalier treatment of the state constitution." Note, supra note
79, at 314 (footnote omitted).
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mine whether a state court is free to choose between federal and state
constitutions. Justice Linde has argued that a state court always must

invoke its own constitution.99 He insists that "[t]he logic of constitutional law demands that nonconstitutional issues be disposed of first,
state constitutional issues second, and federal constitutional issues
last."' 10 0 State and federal claims are alternative rather than cumulative, Linde reasons, because no Fourteenth Amendment violation occurs until the state courts uphold challenged state governmental action
as consistent with the state constitution.' 01 The corollary to Linde's
rule is that if the state court invalidates governmental action under the

state constitution, the court "cannot move on to a second proposition
invalidating the state's action under the federal Constitution."'' 0

The California Supreme Court's practices indicate that it does not

accept Linde's hierarchy of constitutional analysis. 0 3 The question re-

mains whether this analysis should be followed when granting a claimant constitutional relief. The answer is "no." First, Linde was writing
about judicial review of legislative regulations. His theory does not apply to individual acts by executive officers. If a police officer enters a
home without a warrant, absent exigent circumstances or consent, the
Fourth Amendment violation is complete at the moment of entry. Subsequent state court condemnation of the intrusion as offensive to the
state constitution does not alter this fact. Second, the existence of conflicting federally protected rights should foreclose resolution of a case
on the basis of the state constitution, as in Diamondv. Bland."° Third,

specific state constitutional provisions may conflict with federal constitutional guarantees. 00 Fourth, the subject matter may virtually require
99. Linde, Without "DueProcess'-UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon. 49 OR. L. REv. 125
(1970).
100. Id at 182.
101. Id at 133-34. Linde's theory has been criticized on the ground that since it cannot
logically be restricted to state court operations, it could be used to preclude federal judicial
intervention until the highest state court had approved the state action. Project Report,
supra note 14, at 288.
102. Linde, supra note 99, at 133.
103. See, e.g., cases cited in note 81 supra which did not examine possible violations of
the state constitution before ruling on federal constitutional claims.
104. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974). See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
105. For example, article I, section 11, of the Michigan Constitution. prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, adds: "The provisions of this section shall not be construed to
bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or
any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling
house in this state." United States Supreme Court decisions, however, require exclusion of
evidence in circumstances specifically excepted by this provision. See. e.g., Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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a rule of nationwide application. Fifth, the question presented may be
such that any answer will so polarize society that the state court feels
compelled to invoke the prestige of the Federal Constitution and, if
only by denial of certiorari, to share responsibility for its decision with
the United States Supreme Court. 0 6 Sixth, the state court may wish to
influence the United States Supreme Court.' 7 Finally, from a federalism standpoint, there is value in state courts assuming responsibility for
protecting federal rights.
Significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions may warrant reliance upon the state charter.' 08 For example, the difference between the negative command of
the Eighth Amendment that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,"
and the positive assurance of California Constitution, article I, section
12 that "[a] person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except
for capital crimes," supports the conclusion that while Congress may
deny bail to protect the public safety,' 09 the California Legislature may
not."l0 In contrast, California's constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches ' and self-incrimination" 2 were derived directly
from the Federal Constitution" 3 and, therefore, offer no apparent basis
for the divergent interpretations placed5 upon them in People v.
Brisendine"I4 or 4llen v. Superior Court."1
If there are no meaningful differences between the texts of analogous federal and state guarantees, the state court should next look to
other relevant provisions of its own constitution. On November 5,
1974, article I, section 1 of the California Constitution was amended to
include a right of privacy. This provision, cited in support of a public
policy favoring protection of privacy rights in Tavernetti v. Superior
106. Eg., Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976).
107. See Karst, Serrano v. Priest-A State Court'sResponsibilitiesand Opportunitiesin the
Development of FederalConstitutionalLaw, 60 CAL. L. REV. 720, 748 (1972).
108. This was the rationale of People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1972).
109. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952) (dictum); 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976).
110. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973).
111. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
112. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
113. See J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON
THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, 1849 at 47-48, 293-94 (1850), discussed in
Note, Rediscovering the CaliforniaDeclarationofRights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481, 486, 500-01
(1974).
114. 13 CaL 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). See notes 96-98 and
accompanying text supra.
115. 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976). See note 80 supra.
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Court,"6 in all probability will be relied upon to distinguish federal
precedent on the ground that the Federal Constitution contains no parallel provision. Whether it makes sense to extend the exclusionary rule
to coincide with the broader scope of privacy resulting from the
amendment to section 1 of article I is, however, an altogether different
question." 17 A course more in keeping with the intent of the voters who
approved the amendment might be to view the privacy right as furnishing a tort cause of action against private infringement.
Departure from Supreme Court precedent may be justified when
state constitutional history clearly reflects an intention to confer greater
protection against state government than the Federal Constitution affords from federal government, or an intention to resort to decisional
criteria different from those established by federal courts. Debates and
proceedings during California's two constitutional conventions are of
particular relevance where adequate records were kept. Unfortunately,
"the reliability and quality of the available historical sources frequently
render such an inquiry difficult and its results uncertain .
,.8
It has been suggested that federal precedent may be rejected on the
basis of state statutes expressing a public policy relevant to the issue
decided. 19 California Penal Code section 653n,110 for example, makes
privacy in public restrooms a state policy. The statute, cited in People v.
Triggs,12 1 can be found to create an expectation of privacy protected by
California law if not by the Fourth Amendment. 22 The California
statute may be viewed as affecting judicial construction of what consti2 3
tutes an unreasonable search under the California Constitution.
Thus, a reasonable search by Fourth Amendment standards could,
under the circumstances set forth in the privacy statute, be held to violate the California Constitution, even though the two provisions are
essentially identical. One drawback of making constitutional rights de116. 22 Cal. 3d 187, 194, 583 P.2d 737, 742, 148 Cal. Rptr. 883, 888 (1978)., Cf.Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494, 500-04 (Alaska 1975), which acknowledged a similar right of privacy in
Alaska.
117. Note, Rediscovering the CaiforniaDeclarationofRights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481, 50204 (1974).
118. Id at 510. California's historical sources are surveyed in id at 485-93.
119. People v. Norman, 36 Cal. App. 3d 879, 112 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1974), vacated, 14
Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975).
120. CAL. PEN. CODE § 653n (West 1970) provides in part: "Any person who installs or
who maintains ... any two-way mirror permitting observation of an) restroom, toilet [or]
bathroom ... is guilty of a misdemeanor."
121. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 893, 506 P.2d 232, 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 414 (1973).
122. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
123. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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pendent upon statutes is that the legislature can repeal its enactments.
It could be argued that repeal of Penal Code section 653n would destroy any expectation of privacy in public restrooms and thereby constitutionalize surreptitious police surveillance in that context. 124
Subject matter may have a bearing in occasional cases. The
United States Supreme Court might decline to find a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection where to do so
would deeply involve federal courts in supervising complex operations
of state government. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 21 the Supreme Court refused to invalidate a state public
school financing system, emphasizing that
every claim arising under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship between national and state power
under our federal system. Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of determining whether a State's laws are to
or
be accorded the traditional presumption of constitutionality,
126
are to be subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny.
Reaching a contrary conclusion under the equal protection provisions
2 8 the California
of the state constitution' 27 in Serrano v. Priest,"
Supreme Court justified its rejection of Rodriguez on the ground that
"[t]he constraints of federalism, so necessary to the proper functioning
of our unique system of national government, are not applicable to this
court in its determination of whether our own state's public school
financing system runs afoul of state constitutional provisions." 129 Specifically, the California Supreme Court contrasted its own familiarity
with matters of state financing and state educational policy with the
30
United States Supreme Court's admitted lack of expertise.'
That state courts are in a better position to adjudicate certain matters than federal courts does not mean that any and all subject matter is
amenable to judicial review. The argument used in Serrano to dist124. Professor Anthony Amsterdam has attacked the actual expectation of privacy element of Mr. Justice Harlan's reformulation of Katz v. United States, supra note 122, on the
ground that governmental action could diminish one's expectation and, consequently, one's
constitutional right, of privacy. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 384 (1974).
125. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
126. Id at 44.
127. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7, art. IV, § 16.
128. 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976).
129. Id at 766-67, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
130. Id at 766, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (citing San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I at 42 (1973)). See Lipson, Serrano v. Priest,I and
11" The ContinuingRole ofthe CalforniaSupreme Court inDeciding QuestionsArising Under
the Caif/ornia Constitution, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 697, 708 (1976).
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inguish Rodriguez has been employed elsewhere to justify judicial interference with legislative economic regulations. Striking down a
statute forbidding a pharmacist from advertising his prices for dangerous or narcotic drugs, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned
that while
in the federal courts the "due process barrier to substantive legislation as to economic matters has been in effect removed," the
same cannot be said with respect to state courts and state constitutional law. This difference between federal and state constitutional law represents a sound development, one which takes into
account the fact that "state courts may be in a better position to
review local economic legislation than the Supreme Court. State
courts, since their precedents are not of national authority, may
better adapt their decisions to local economic conditions and
needs."

131

The judicial philosophy expressed by the Pennsylvania court is reminiscent of the doctrine of substantive due process, replete with many of
the "superlegislature"
problems long recognized by the Supreme
32
Court. 1

"Few legal doctrines have been subjected to more bitter criticism
than this testing of regulatory legislation by the due process clause,"
Professor Monrad Paulsen writes. 133 The same should be said about
judges imposing their economic and political philosophies upon legislators through equal protection clauses. Since 1937, the United States
Supreme Court has not voided economic legislation by applying a doctrine that eventually came to be viewed as anti-democratic. 134 Courts

should be wary of other doctrines that have similar effects. Because
proximity is not synonymous with competency, federalism offers a
weak argument for judicial incursion into legislative territory.
Subject matter is significant in another respect: the need for nationwide uniformity may outweigh a state's interest in diversity. As
one advocate of independent state grounds for constitutional adjudication has acknowledged,
[c]ertainly greater reliance on state constitutions by state courts
may foster some confusion as each state develops its particular
131. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 190. 272 A.2d 487, 490
(1971) (footnote omitted). Cf.Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201 (1971) (opinion of Mr. Justice
Black as Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit); Dunkerson v. Russell, 502 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. App.
1973).
132. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) quoting Day-Brite Lighting
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
133. Paulsen, The Persistenceof Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv.
91(1950).
134. Id at 92.
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jurisprudence. In an age of ever increasing technology and mobility, the American people may find it "curiouser and curiouser"
that conceptions of their fundamental rights should
change dra35
matically when they merely cross a state line.1
If personal mobility favors constitutional uniformity, 13 6 that need is
even more evident than in the area of personal searches. A "vast majority"1 37 of states considering the question have followed the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Robinson138 and
Gustafson v. Florida,139 authorizing personal searches incident to custo-

dial arrest. The need for a single rule understood by all citizens is buttressed by the need for a uniform rule comprehensible to federal and
state officers. Accordingly, in State v. Florance,4 0 the Oregon Supreme

Court abandoned its earlier contrary approach and adopted the rule of
Robinson, stating that "[t]he law of search and seizure is badly in need
of simplification. . . .Not adopting the rule of Robinson would add
further confusion in that there would then be an 'Oregon rule' and a
'federal rule.' ,"' A bare majority of the California Supreme Court
4 2 without responding to the
rejected Robinson in People v. Brisendine"

dissenting justices' argument that "[t]o have two sets of rules under es1' 43
sentially identical constitutional provisions would create confusion.'
Although less compelling, a case can be made for uniform federal
and state rules of evidence. Adopting the rule of Lego v. Twomey,'"

that confessions may be proved voluntary by a preponderance of the
evidence, the Supreme Court of Minnesota observed that its holding
meant that "the same standard applies in both state and Federal courts
in Minnesota."'' 45 Divergent federal and state rules on the same subject

may confuse lawyers and unsettle lay notions about the rule of law.
135. Lipson, Serrano v. Priest,I and I." The ContinuingRole of the Cal/fornia Supreme
Court in Deciding Questions Arising Under the California Constitution, 10 U.S.F. L. REV.
697, 721 (1976).
136. Cf.In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 111-15, 372 P.2d 897, 901-05, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 861-65
(1962) (Gibson, C.J., concurring) (mobility favoring uniformity of municipal ordinances).
137. Howard, supra note 77, at 898.
138. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
139. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
140. 270 Or. 169, 527 P.2d 1202 (1974).
141. Id at 183-84, 527 P.2d at 1209.
142. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
143. Id at 555, 531 P.2d at 1117, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (Burke, J., dissenting, joined by
McComb and Clark, JJ.). See also Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 162,491 P.2d 1,
8, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649, 656 (1971) in which three members of the court concurred in the majority opinion upholding California's vicarious exclusionary rule. (Burke, J., concurring in the
result, joined by Wright, C.J., and McComb, J.).
144. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
145. State v. Wajda, 296 Minn. 29, 32, 206 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1973).
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Uniformity was not a factor discussed by the California Supreme Court

14 6
in People v. Jimenez wherein the Lego approach was rejected.
Lego's invitation to the states to formulate different rules' 4 7 did not

make uniformity irrelevant. As Professor Howard points out, state
courts too rarely debate the need for national uniformity. 4
Lastly, the existence of a state rule contrary to a subsequent
United States Supreme Court decision is a pertinent neutral factor.

Adherence to the earlier state rule may be justified on the basis of stare
decisis and the need for predictability. The case for retention is strongest where the prior rule was grounded on state law;"' it is weakest

where the earlier state rule was based upon federal law. The state's
interest in continuity rarely, if ever, warrants perpetuating a misinterpretation of federal law. 5 °
The foregoing principles, if consistently and explicitly applied,

would ensure that state courts did not merely substitute their notion of
justice for that of legislative bodies or of the United States Supreme
Court. Unfortunately some state courts, particularly the California
Supreme Court, recognize no obligation to base constitutional rationales on these neutral criteria. The problems which arise from disre-

gard of this obligation will be discussed in the following section.
III. The Dangers of State Constitutional Interpretation
A.

Frustrating the Political Process

Easily the most troubling and the least justifiable feature of the
California Supreme Court's mode of state constitutional interpretation

is its "dual reliance" technique. By invoking the state constitution the
146. 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978). Jimenez, however, announced a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure, not a state constitutional requirement. Accordingly, the decision does not bar enactment of a different rule by the legislature.
Id at 605, 580 P.2d at 677, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
147. 404 U.S. at 489.
148. Howard, supra note 77, at 937.
149. E.g., Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 716, 470 P.2d 345, 350, 87 Cal. Rptr.
361, 366 (1970).
150. E.g., People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969), disapprovedin People v. Chojnacky, 8 Cal. 3d 759, 764, 505 P.2d 530, 533, 106 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109
(1973) (plurality opinion). But e. People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 CaL
Rptr. 861 (1978) (California supreme court refused to follow decision of United States
Supreme Court interpreting the federal right against self-incrimination under nearly identical circumstances); People v. Johnson, 85 Cal. App. 3d 684, 697-704, 149 Cal. Rptr. 661, 66874 (1978) (Roth, P.J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should have extended the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to defendant attorneys conducted before formal charges were
brought).
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court insulates its decisions from federal judicial review; by simultaneously invoking the Federal Constitution, the court effectively blocks
popular review through the initiative process. In a sense, this dual reliance makes the people of California the prisoners of the privileges conferred by their own state constitution.
The dual reliance technique in particular, and state constitutional
interpretation in general, are made attractive by the United States
Supreme Court's independent adequate state ground doctrine. This
5
concept was best explained by Justice Jackson in Herb v. Pitcairn:'1
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the
principle that it will not review judgments of state courts that rest
on adequate and independent state grounds. . . . The reason is
so obvious that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement.
It is found in the partitioning of power between the state and
federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power over state judgments is to correct them
to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And
our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions.
We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we
could amount to
corrected its views of federal laws, our review
52
nothing more than an advisory opinion.'
This view was reaffirmed in Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Commission: 53 "It is undoubtedly 'the settled rule that where the judgment
of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the
other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal
ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support
the judgment.' "154
Although the independent state ground doctrine may be self-imposed rather than constitutionally compelled, 5 5 there is no good reason
to believe that it will be discarded' 56 or significantly modified' 57 by the
present Supreme Court. Therefore, it is the responsibility of state
courts not to abuse the doctrine.
151. 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
152. Id at 125-26.
153. 379 U.S. 487 (1965). Accord, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428 (1963).
154. Id at 489, quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
155. Sandalow, Henry v. Mississiopiand the Adequate State Ground- Proposalsfora ReisedDoctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 187, 201 (1965).
156. Wilkes, The New Federalismin CriminalProcedureRevisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729, 751
(1976). But Sf Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974)
(Fourth Amendment does not extend to sights observed in "open fields").
157. Modification was suggested in Note, State Constitutional GuaranteesAs Adequate
State Ground- Supreme Court Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
737, 757 (1976).
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Once the state court has invalidated state action under its own
constitution there is no need to buttress that conclusion by reference to
the Federal Constitution, as the California Supreme Court did in, inter
60
159
alia, People v. Ramey,15 8 People v. Scott, and People v. Edward.'
As a matter of constitutional logic, Justice Linde points out, when the
state court rules under its own constitution "it cannot move on to a
second proposition invalidating the state's action under the federal
Constitution."' 6' An alternative to the Linde analysis would be to first
address the federal constitutional question, and if the court finds state
action violative of the federal constitution it should inquire no further.
Chief Justice Wright, concurring in Jolicoeur v. Mihalv' 6 2 wrote:
There is no stronger statement of governing policy considerations
in any particular circumstance than an express declaration embodied inour federal Constitution. Where, as here, such a declaration is manifestly dispositive of the single issue no good
purpose is served by a concurrent examination of state or federal
policies, or legislative histories, in an attempt to ascertain that the
supreme law of the land must be adhered to because
63 lesser policy
considerations likewise require the same result.'
The disproportionate consequence of even a casual reference to a
second constitution has prompted severe criticism of the California
Supreme Court. One dissenting justice complained:
[B]y relying on both the state and federal Constitutions this court,
in effect, prevents any other institution, state or federal, from reconsidering the issues presented by this case. By invoking the
state Constitution this Court insulates itself from review by the
158. 16 Cal. 3d 263, 275, 545 P.2d 1333, 1340, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636 (1976). Occasionally an intermediate appellate decision has invoked both federal and state constitutions.
Eg., Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976).
159. 16 Cal. 3d 242, 250, 546 P.2d 327, 333, 128 Cal. Rptr. 39, 45 (1976).
160. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1105, 458 P.2d 713, 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1969). "Dual
reliance" implies express reference to both federal and state constitutional provisions. As a
practical matter, the same result generally follows from ambiguous reference to constitutional guarantees of unspecified origin. Eg., In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457. 467, 584 P.2d 1097,
1103, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 497 (1978) ("principles of equal protection" invoked without reference to any constitutional text). See Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380 (1978)
(Justice Rehnquist sitting as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.
117, 126 (1945); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940). In People v. Triggs, 8
Cal. 3d 884, 891-92 n.5, 506 P.2d 232, 237 n.5, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 413 n.5, (1973), the court
recognized that with respect to California search decisions "it is often difficult to determine
whether a case was disposed of on the basis of state or federal constitutional law. The issue
is, of course, crucial to federal review of our decisions."
161. Linde, supra note 99 at 133.
162. 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971).
163. Id. at 583, 488 P.2d at 12, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (Wright, C.J., concurring, joined by
McComb and Burke, JJ.) quotedin In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 945, 569 P.2d 1286, 1301,
141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 313 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

Summer 19791

ALL SAIL AND NO ANCHOR

United States Supreme Court. . . .By resting its decision on the
federal Constitution as well this court severely inhibits political
review through the legislative or initiative process. No court
should presume that it is so immune from error that it may foreclose every means of challenging its decisions."
Commentators have made the same point. Professor Scott Bice
has characterized as "illegitimate" the use of the dual reliance technique to chill the political process.' 65 "Such action uses the limitations
on the power of federal courts in the federal system to increase the state
court's decision-making power vis-A-vis other branches of state government, perhaps beyond the effective control of even a super-majority of
the state's citizens."' 66 Justice Linde adds that attempting to amend the
state constitution in order to relitigate dictum about the federal constitution is "politically unsatisfactory."' 167 Except on the most emotionally charged issues, persuading the electorate to amend the state
constitution without an immediate prospect of changing the law is simply not feasible. Apart from the popular rejection of the California
Supreme Court's invalidation of the death penalty, 168 there appears to
be no other instance in which a later state constitutional amendment
overrode an unpopular court decision. 169 It is to be hoped the California Supreme Court will agree that "the possibility of reversal of judicial
decision through the political process is not an evil, but a necessary
check on judicial power. Without the possibility of constitutional
amendment, courts would in effect be a continuing constitutional con1 70
vention, functioning almost entirely outside the democratic process."
If the court truly accepts this proposition, it should refrain from using
the dual reliance technique which, as has been demonstrated, impedes
the democratic process. In addition to blocking the political process,
dual reliance, and state constitutional interpretation in general, often
usurp the power of the legislative branch.
B. Assuming the Legislative Function
State constitutional interpretation often results in a reallocation of
164. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 945-46, 569 P.2d 1286, 1301, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 313
(1977) (Clark, J., dissenting).
165. Bice, Anderson andtheAdequate State Ground,45 So. CAL. L. REv. 750, 757 (1972).
166. Id at 757-58. See also id at 766.
167. Linde, Book Review, 52 OR.L. REV. 325, 337 n.37 (1973).
168. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 reinstated the death penalty after the California court held
it to be cruel and unusual punishment in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880,
100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
169. Wilkes, supra note 156, at 751 (1976).
170. The Supreme Court of Calffornia 1974-1975, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 451 (1976).
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power from state legislatures to state courts. Judicial willingness to
oversee and, on occasion, to assume the legislative function is based in
part upon a distrust of the legislative process. Justice Holmes insisted
that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts."'' Not all state
courts share his view. The California Supreme Court declared:
Courts have explained that powerful economic forces can obtain
substantial representation in the halls of the Legislature and in
the departments of the executive branch and thus do not impel
the same kind of judicial protection as do the minorities: the unpopular religions, the racial subgroups, the criminal defendants,
the politically weak and underrepresented. 7 2
The Nebraska Supreme Court has spoken in plainer language, warning
that legislatures may become "subservient to pressure groups which
seek and frequently secure the enactment of statutes advantageous to a
particular industry and detrimental to another. . . ."
Two fundamental objections to this concept of the judicial role are
immediately apparent. First, courts are not competent legislatures.
"They cannot marshall the facts necessary to play out the legislative
role. They cannot conduct legislative hearings to obtain evidence and
testimony, and they cannot, without doing violence to the adversary
system, go outside the record to find additional information upon
which to base a particular decision."' 7 4 Second, the lack of direct accountability of judges to the people may be as much a vice as a virtue.
The danger is that courts will "substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies" and "hold laws unconstitu75
tional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely."
Reliance upon state constitutions has afforded state courts new
freedom in applying established standards of judicial review. The California Supreme Court has invoked the strict scrutiny equal protection
standard by finding fundamental interests 76 and suspect classifications 77 where the United States Supreme Court has not. Almost inevi171.
172.
(1971).
173.
174.

Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 142-43, 481 P.2d 242, 250, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 242

Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 788, 104 N.W.2d 227, 234 (1960).
Cameron, The Placefor JudicialActivism on the Part of a State's Highest Court, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 279, 282 (1977).
175. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
176. Compare Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976)
with San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education as a
fundamental interest).
177. Sairer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (classification based on gender).
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tably, strict scrutiny is fatal to legislation.' 78 More important, state
courts are free to fashion new standards ofjudicial review which afford
less deference to legislative judgments. Thus, the reasonable relationship test of due process has, in various state courts, yielded to a substantial relation test, 179 to a real and substantial relation test,' 80 and
even to a close and substantial relationship test.' 8 ' In each instance,
legislative action was invalidated. Discontented with their present
broad powers of judicial review, two justices of the California Supreme
Court now propose a new standard for review under the state equal
protection guarantee. Legislation affecting important interests or creating sensitive classifications can survive only if the court concludes that
the statute significantly furthers important state interests.' 8 2 This standard is described by California's Chief Justice as "a veto power over
almost any legislation."'8 3
The extent to which courts may mistake personal preferences for
constitutional compulsion can be appreciated only by considering specific examples. In American Motorcycle Association v. Davids,'8" a
Michigan Court of Appeals struck down on state constitutional
grounds a statute requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. This "admittedly wholesome legislation"'' 8 5 abridged the right to be let alone,
the court opined, without hearing a real and substantial relationship to
the public health, safety and welfare.'8 6 Eight years later this decision
was overruled by a divided Michigan Supreme Court.'8 7 The reason88
There the
ing in Davids was followed, however, in People v. Fries.1
Supreme Court of Illinois invalidated a similar protective headgear
statute because "[t]he manifest function of the headgear requirement in
issue is to safeguard the person wearing it-whether it is the operator
or a passenger-from head injuries. Such a laudable purpose, however, cannot justify the regulation of what is essentially a matter of per178. See Gunther, The Sufpreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword"In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:. A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
179. Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 551, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (1954).
180. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life, 307
Mass. 408, 418, 30 N.E.2d 269, 275 (1940).
181. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975).
182. Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 601, 586 P.2d 916, 927, 150 Cal. Rptr.
435, 446 (1978) (Mosk, J., concurring, joined by Newman, J.).
183. Id at 608, 586 P.2d at 932, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 451 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
184. 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968).
185. Id at 356, 158 N.W.2d at 75.
186. Id at 358, 158 N.W.2d at 76.
187. Adrian v. Poucher, 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798 (1976).
188. 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969).
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sonal safety."' 8 9 The court based its decision on the state constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment. 190 The case of Simon v. Sargent'9 1

makes clear that the Federal Constitution compels no such result. The
expense to the public and the increased liability to other motorists involved in motorcycle accidents constitute such obvious justifications for
the statutes that one can only conclude that these courts did not try
very hard to find them.

In an opinion which completes the merger of the old substantive
due process 192 with the new equal protection,' 93 the Alaska Supreme
Court held the state's marijuana law invalid under the state constitu-

tion to the extent that it proscribed personal home use.'1 4 The prohibition, the court reasoned, interfered with a state constitutional right of

privacy "consonant with the character of life in Alaska,"' 95 and bore no
96
close and substantial relationship to any legitimate state interest.'
The court reached this conclusion after surveying medical literature on
the subject. 197 Greater deference customarily is, and should be, shown

to legislation which "incorporates conclusions or assumptions concerning an array of medical, psychological and moral issues of considerable
controversy in contemporary America."'' 9

State constitutions frequently have been the source of a judicial
rule of reason limiting the power of legislatures to deal with economic
affairs. 199 Advertising, 2°° price fixing, 2° 1licensing,2° and manufactur189. Id at 450, 250 N.E.2d at 151.
190. Id
191. 346 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass. 1972), aft'd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
192. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
193. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
194. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
195. Id at 504.
196. Id at 511.
197. Id at 504-08.
198. United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1973). See also People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979) (upholding the constitutionality
of a state statute forbidding treatment of cancer patients with laetrile).
199. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53
Nw. U.L. REV. 226 (1958); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 879-91 (1976); Paulsen, The PersistenceofSubstantive Due
Processin the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
200. E.g., Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487
(1971). See note 131 and accompanying text supra.
201. E.g., Estell v. City of Birmingham, 291 Ala. 680, 286 So. 2d 872 (1973); Gillette
Dairy, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Prods. Bd., 192 Neb. 89, 219 N.W.2d 214 (1974).
202. Eg., Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Siggins, 359 Pa. 25, 58 A.2d 464 (1948);
Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va. 481, 39 S.E.2d 348 (1946).
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ing regulations2 "3 have been struck down under state charters. It would
be difficult to characterize the rationales of these decisions as anything
but based on substantive due process, particularly since they concern
the type of economic judgments which have long been considered best
left to legislatures.
Regarding California's philosophy, it would be comforting to accept the assurance of Bixby v. Pierno2 4 that "[t]he courts have realized
that in the area of economic due process the will of the majority as
expressed by the Legislature.

.

.must be permitted to meet contempo-

' 20 5

But this is not an accurate historical assessrary crucial problems.
ment, unless one takes a constricted view of the term "crucial
problems." In State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners,
Inc., 206 for example, the California Supreme Court invalidated on federal and state due process grounds a statute authorizing a board appointed by the governor to set minimum prices for dry cleaning.
Dissenting, Justice Traynor protested that the majority's reasoning
"proceeds from a misconception of this court's function in passing
upon the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. ' 20 7 It is true that
the California Supreme Court has stated that the state constitution will
be the court's first referrent "in the area of fundamental civil liberties."'208 However, in Thrift-D-Lux, the majority's assertion that the
legislature may not impose unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions
on the pursuit of private business activities 209 "clearly implies the view
that there is a constitutional right to engage in a gainful occupation. ' 21 °
It remains to be seen just how far the California court will extend this
type of reasoning.
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution now provides:
"All people.., have inalienable rights. Among these are. . . acquiring, possessing, and protecting property."21 ' Conceivably legislation
regulating business affairs could be stricken down as an impermissible
interference with this specified, and therefore fundamental, right. Arguments advanced by other state courts to justify review of economic
203. People ex rel Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 176 Colo. 396, 490 P.2d 940
(1971).
204. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
205. Id at 142, 481 P.2d at 250, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
206. 40 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953).
207. Id at 453, 254 P.2d at 39.
208. People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753, 758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr.
297, 302 n.4 (1975).
209. 40 Cal. 2d at 441, 254 P.2d at 33.
210. Hetherington, supra note 199, at 227.
211. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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legislation, such as state court familiarity with local economic needs
and conditions and legislative susceptibility to lobbying groups, already
have been recognized by the California Supreme Court. 2 12 Thus there
is at least cause for some concern that California courts will enter this
new arena. Even if the present court does not impose its preferences in
the area of economic regulation, a future court, armed with the state
constitutional precedent currently in the making, very well may.
The California Supreme Court's willingness to assume functions it
has previously entrusted to the legislature is illustrated by People v.
Drew. 2 13 For twenty-five years the court refused to abandon the
M'Naghten test for sanity in a criminal case, each time declaring that
reform was for the Legislature. 21 4 In Drew, however, the court discarded M'Naghten in favor of the American Law Institute test. At the
time Drew was decided, the question was under legislative consideration.21' One dissenting justice expressed the hope that "the legislative
response will be swift and certain in restoring our state's established
system of mental defenses. 2 16 Should the Legislature codify California's version of the M'Naghten Rule, it will remain to be seen whether
the court will constitutionalize its own preference for a different standard or defer to the legislature's judgment.
Considerable insight into the respective roles that California's judicial and legislative branches will play may be gained from the state
supreme court's determination of a pending case in which the constitutionality of California Evidence Code section 1235 is challenged.2 17
That statute provides: "Evidence of a statement made by a witness is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing. '218 The statute altered prior law
by permitting the jury to consider the inconsistent statement as substantive evidence rather than merely for its impeachment value. In
212. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 766-67, 557 P.2d 929. 952, 135 Cal. Rptr.

345, 368 (1976); Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 142-43, 481 P.2d 242, 250, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234,
242 (1971).
213. 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978).
214. Id at 353, 583 P.2d at 1329-30, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 286-87 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
215. Id at 355, 583 P.2d at 1331, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 288 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
216. Id at 361, 583 P.2d at 1335, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (Clark, J., dissenting).
217. After this writing, in People v. Chavez, Crim. 20673, filed on January 29, 1980, a 4
to 3 majority of the California Supreme Court ruled that the state constitutional confrontation clause is not violated by the admission of a prior statement of a witness who testifies at
trial and is subject to full cross-examination by the defendant at that time.
218. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
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People v. Johnson21 9 and People v. Green,22 ° the California Supreme

Court concluded that section 1235 violated the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause because it failed to provide for contemporaneous
cross-examination. The United States Supreme Court, however,
reached a contrary conclusion in Caiffornia v. Green.2 2' That decision
was necessarily accepted by the state court, on remand, as dispositive of
the federal question.2 22
A few years later, California Constitution, article I, section 15 was
amended to provide that an accused has the right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against the defendant." 223 The question is whether
the supreme court will invoke article I, section 15, to reestablish its
choice of values over those made by the legislature. 224 The significance
of the question derives from the fact that it is difficult to conceive of a
stronger case for upholding legislation. Evidence Code section 1235 is
not the work of any special interest group; it is the product of the Law
Revision Commission's nine year study.225 The Commission reasoned
that
[t]he dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect
are largely non-existent. The declarant is in court and may be
examined and cross-examined in regard to his statements and
their subject matter. . . . The trier of fact has the declarant
before it and can observe his demeanor and the nature of his testimony as he denies or tries to explain away the inconsistency.22 6
227
and
Moreover, section 1235 codifies the rule favored by Chadbourn
229
2 28
a
in
and
courts
in
federal
followed
the
rule
is
and
McCormick,
230
forto
power
legislature's
the
Since
growing number of state courts.
219. 68 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051
(1969).
220. 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), vacated and remandedsub
nom. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
221. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
222. People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 989-90, 479 P.2d 998, 1003-04, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494,
499-500 (1971).
223. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
224. The court has already indicated its concern over "[t]he considerable potential that a
jury, even with... a limiting instruction, will view prior inculpatory statements as substantive evidence of guilt rather than as merely reflecting on the declarant's veracity." People v.
Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 112, 545 P.2d 272, 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 367 (1976).
225. See CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
THE CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE (1965).
226. Law Revision Commission, Comment to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
227. III J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 996-97 n.2 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970).
228. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 39 (2d ed. 1972).
229. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (1973).
230. See, e.g., ARK.STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801 (West
1979); ME. REV. STAT., Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN., Evid.
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mulate rules of evidence is superior to that of the courts, 23 1 the modem

rule may be rejected only by embedding it in constitutional concrete.
Such rigidity should only be introduced into the hearsay rule for compelling reasons.232 Since a state court's distaste for a rule formulated by
the Law Revision Commission, enacted by the Legislature, and approved by the United States Supreme Court is not a compelling reason,
the necessary compulsion must be sought in the text of the California
Constitution. Three California appellate courts have been unable to
find it there233 because the texts of the federal and state confrontation
clauses are indistinguishable-the language of the California provision
is taken from the Sixth Amendment-and because both the California
Constitution Revision Commission 234 and the electorate235 thought that
article I, section 15, added new support, not new content, to the existing
federal guarantee. It is therefore apparent that should the California
Supreme Court again strike down Evidence Code section 1235 it will
have assumed the legislative function. As the next section will demonstate, judicial activism, achieved through unjustified reliance on the
state constitution, has grave consequences for the judicial system, as
well as upon the legislative and political processes.
C.

Undermining the Judicial Process

Part of the price of state constitutional independence is the reduced accountability of the highest state court. Immunity from the
United States Supreme Court may produce opinions which misstate either the case or the law. Worse, relieved of the necessity of persuading
higher judicial authority that its decision is correct, a state supreme
court may not explain its decision at all. If these fears seem unrealistic,
consider the following three decisions of the California Supreme Court.
People v. Scott236 condemned a weapons frisk made by police ofRule 801 (West Supp. 1979); MONT. R. Ev., Rule 613 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. R. EvID. 801
(1978), N.D. CENT. CODE, Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 (Supp. 1979). WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 908.01 (West 1975).
231. People v. Buckley, 143 Cal. 375, 393, 77 P. 169, 177 (1904) (Beatty, J., concurring).
See also People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 872, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964)
(where the legislature does not address an issue, a court may fill the gap).
232. See Comment, Confrontation and the HearsayRule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).
233. People v. Bertoldo, 77 Cal. App. 3d 627, 143 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1978); People v. Contreras, 57 Cal. App. 3d 816, 129 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1976); People v. Browning, 45 Cal. App. 3d
125, 119 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1975).
234. See PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, pt. 5, at 24 (1974);
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT IV ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, at 7 (1970).

235.

CAL. VOTERS PAMPHLET

(General Election November 5, 1974) at 26.

236. 16 Cal. 3d 242, 546 P.2d 327, 128 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1976).
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ficers for their self-protection when they elected to transport an apparently intoxicated man and his small child to the home of the child's
mother instead of arresting the father. The court stated: "The People
contend that the fact of proposed transportation in a police vehicle is a
special circumstance which per se justifies a pat-down search any time
an individual is to be so transported. '2 37 The court refused to adopt
such an exception to the warrant requirement "[b]ecause of the potential ramifications." 23 The State, however, did not advance the contention attributed to it; instead it expressly disavowed that position,
explaining:
In his petition for hearing appellant states that this appeal
presents the question of "whether, as the Court of Appeal below
held, the element of transportation in a police vehicle justifies a
pat-down search in every non-arrest situation." . . . Most emphatically, that is not the question in this case nor could it be in
any case. "There is no formula for the determination of reasoableness.2 39Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.,
The State insisted that a weapons frisk was justified because it was a
lesser intrusion into privacy than the arrest which otherwise would
have occurred. It was, of course, easier for the court to reject the broad
contention attributed to the State than the narrow claim they actually
advanced.'o
Secure in the knowledge that United States Supreme Court review
is unavailable, a state court may take undue liberties with federal precedent in order to strengthen its own state constitutional interpretation.
People v. Ramey2 4 held that absent exigent circumstances or consent, a
police officer entering a home to effect an arrest must have a warrant.
The decision was founded on both the federal and state constitutions.2 4 2 Although Ramey was "at variance with the recent views of the
United States Supreme Court,24 3 the California Supreme Court insisted
that in Coolidge Y. New Hampshire2'
five members of the [federal high] court expressed agreement
237. Id at 247, 546 P.2d at 331, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
238. Id at 250, 546 P.2d at 332, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
239. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 13. The court's attention was drawn to its misstatement of the People's position in Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 2. The petition
was denied on March 24, 1976.
240. See Note, Arrest: The Caifornia Prerequisitefor a PretransportationPat-Down
Searchfor Weapons, 65 CAL. L. Rav. 416, 425 (1977), criticizing the Scott decision.
241. 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976).
242. Id at 275, 276, 545 P.2d at 1340, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 636, 637.
243. Note, WarrantlessArrests Within the Home, 65 CAL. L. REv. 406, 407 (1977).
244. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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with the proposition that "[i]t is clear, then, that the notion that
the warrantless entry of a man's house in order to arrest him on
probable cause isperse legitimate is in fundamental conflict with
the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and
seizures inside a man's house without warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of some one of a number of well defined

'exigent circumstances.'

"245

For this proposition the California court accepted the Supreme Court's
reliance upon some of Justice Harlan's statements in Jones v. United
States.24 6 But Justice Harlan did not endorse the quoted dictum.
Rather, he stated that on the issue of the validity "of a warrantless entry into a man's house to arrest him on probable cause. . . the Court
again leaves [the question] open. . . . I intimate no view on this subject."24 7 Contrary to the state court's representation, therefore, four not
five Supreme Court justices concurred in that portion of Coolidge relied upon in Ramey.2 48 Nor should it be said that the Ramey majority
was unaware of its misreading of Coolidge. As the dissent pointed out,
the decision was cloaked with undeserved federal authority.24 9
A further device which erodes confidence in the judiciary is the
court's occasional failure to delineate the rationale for its decision. One
example is Allen v. Superior Court,25 ° in which the California Supreme
Court transformed Justice Traynor's two-way street of discovery2 ' into
a blind alley for the prosecutor. Specifically, the court disapproved a
trial court order requiring disclosure of the names of prospective defense witnesses to prospective jurors. 25 2 Although the trial court had
enjoined the prosecutor from contacting named defense witnesses until
their identities were disclosed during the course of trial, the procedure
was found violative of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 3 The plurality opinion relied upon and expanded
245. 16 Cal. 3d at 271, 545 P.2d at 1337-38, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 633-34 (quoting Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971)).
246. 357 U.S. 493,499-500 (1958) (Harlan, J.) (quotedin 16 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 545 P.2d at
1338, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 634).
247. 403 U.S. at 492 (Harlan, J., concurring).
248. Comment, The Legal Efficiency ofProbable Cause Complaints in Light of People V.
Ramey, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 456, 462 (1977).
249. 16 Cal. 3d at 278 n.l, 545 P.2d at 1342 n.1, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.l (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
250. 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976).
251. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 60, 372 P.2d 919, 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881
(1962).
252. The trial court's order contemplated that witnesses' names would be read to potential jurors to ascertain if any of them were acquainted with prospective witnesses. 18 Cal. 3d
at 523, 557 P.2d at 67, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
253. Id at 525, 557 P.2d at 67, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
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Prudhomme v. Superior Court.2 54 The rule enunciated in Prudhomme
rested on the court's perception of the trend of federal requirements.
As subsequent developments made clear, however, this perception was
256
erroneous. 5 All prosecution discovery was thus effectively barred
on the basis of an opinion which relied on federal policies that had
been repudiated by subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions.
Why? The court did not say. Thus, as one commentator has criticized:
"Allen approved Prudhomme on the authority of an independent interpretation of the California Constitution, but did not offer any reasoning
to support its conclusion. 2 57
Allen offends the spirit of California Constitution article VI, section 14,258 which commands that "[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court
and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated." If, as Professor Wechsler believes, "[t]he virtue or demerit
of a judgment turns, therefore, entirely on the reasons that support it
and their adequacy to maintain any choice of values it decrees, ' 259 Allen is indefensible. The court cannot expect such unexplained decisions to be respected or carefully followed. Until "the California
Supreme Court once more decides to address the difficult question of
the constitutional limits of prosecutorial discovery, California will have

a 'rule in search of a reason.'

"260

If Scott, Ramey and Allen are not representative of the California
Supreme Court's opinions, they do reflect several ways in which the
court's newly asserted independence and result-oriented approach have
undermined confidence in its decisions.

Conclusion
The growing use of the doctrine of independent state grounds,
combined with a minimum of judicial restraint, threatens irreparable
harm to our system of government. It emasculates the people's right to
govern through the legislative process, and substitutes for legislation
254. 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970).
255. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970).
256. Note, ProsecutorialDiscovery and the Privilege.4gainstSelf-Incrimination, 66 CAL.
L. REv.332, 339 (1978).
257. Id at 335.
258. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
259. Wechsler, TowardNeutralPrinciolesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.1, 1920 (1959).
260. Note, supra note 156, at 332, 338 (quoting Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d at
529, 557 P.2d at 69, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 778 (Richardson, J., dissenting)).
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the judicial decree process. This process destroys the people's sense of
certainty in relying on the decisions of the nation's highest court. It
lowers confidence in our representative form of government for it prohibits our elected lawmakers from responding with certainty to public
needs.
A judiciary which intentionally undertakes the task of making legislative decisions will, by necessity, become enmeshed in the political
process. It ceases to be above the moods and passions of the moment,
yet it does not possess the ability to conduct a thorough and open examination of the entire subject before it. Such a judiciary ceases to be
perceived as a bastion of rights and justice, and when courts are perceived as anything else, the entire fabric of our judicial system begins to
unravel.
The current trend, however, can be reversed. The court itself can
begin to exercise the restraint which is inherent in its proper role. It
can stop substituting its political judgments for those of the legislature.
It can cease the gamesmanship of dual reliance on both the state and
federal constitutions. Unless the Supreme Court imposes these or similar constraints on its own power, Californians may find that their state
constitution is all sail and no anchor.
If the court fails to reform itself by internal policy, then the people
can effect the reform by other means. For example, the doctrine of
independent state grounds can be restricted by constitutional amendment so as to prevent its misuse in the future. Further, judicial legislation can be promptly repealed by proper legislative action.
Such measures are not lightly undertaken nor should they be. But
then, preservation of our system of government has never been a matter
lightly taken or easily achieved.

